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State and Local Government 
by Daryl 1. McKinstry* 
Introduction 
During the year October 1, 1966 to October 1, 1967, 
approximately 100 cases concerning various phases of state 
and local government were decided by the appellate courts in 
California. Some of the cases concerned themselves with 
other fields of law as well, but only those aspects of the cases 
that directly relate to government are discussed here. 
F or the purpose of providing easy reference, the cases 
decided for the period have been arranged under six major 
headings, in outline form, according to the field covered.1 
* A.B. 1950, University of California; 
LL.B. 1958, Golden Gate College, 
School of Law. County Counsel, 
County of El Dorado. Member, Cali-
fornia State Bar. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to David T. Loofbourrow, Jr., third-
year Student at Golden Gate College, 
School of Law, for assistance in the 
preparation of this article. 
1. Because of the volume of legis-
lation affecting state and local govern-
ment passed in the 1967 session, no 
attempt has been made to comment 
on this legislation. See Cont. Ed. Bar, 
REVIEW OF SELECTED 1967 CODE PRO-
VISIONS (1967). 
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GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN GENERAL 
A. Municipal Corporations 
1. Incorporation 
In Enyeart v. Board of Supervisors of Orange County; 
plaintiff sought, by mandamus, to compel the county board 
of supervisors to set aside an order terminating proceedings 
to incorporate a new city. The question presented was 
whether or not the holders of "oil and gas leases" qualify to 
file protests to terminate the incorporation proceedings. 
While the court held that oil and gas leases constitute "land" 
within the contemplation of the incorporation statutes for 
both petition and protest purposes, and protests by such 
owners can properly be considered by the board of super-
visors, the court determined that the protests were not timely 
filed. Until the 1963 amendment to section 34311 of the 
Government Code, there was no provision for filing supple-
mental protests after the first hearing. In 1963, the following 
was added to that section: 
If at the time set for the first hearing, there are insuffi-
cient written protests filed with the board to terminate 
further proceedings, the meeting shall be recessed not 
less than 14 days, and supplemental protests may be 
filed within 10 days after the first hearing. 
This amendment became effective 2 days after the first 
hearing was held by the board in this case. The protests in 
question were filed some 5 weeks after the first hearing and 
were disallowed by the court for failure to comply with the 
10-day limitation of the 1963 amendment. 
2. Issuance of Bonds 
In Omicini v. City of Eureka/ plaintiffs sought to have 
declared invalid a municipal ordinance that provided for the 
improvement of public parking facilities through the issuance 
of bonds. Their complaint stated that the proceedings that 
2. 66 Cal.2d 728, 58 Cal. Rptr. 733, 3. 246 Cal. App.2d 566, 54 Cal. 
427 P.2d 509 (1967). Rptr. 774 (1966). 
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led to the adoption of the ordinance were invalid, and that 
the alleged need was not supported by the evidence. Defend-
ants filed a general demurrer, and their motion for summary 
judgment was granted. In affirming the summary judgment, 
the appellate court stated that where a challenge is to be 
made on the legality of an ordinance providing for the issu-
ance of bonds for the acquisition and improvement of public 
parking facilities, those contesting such an action must follow 
the statutory procedure as found in section 35271 of the 
Streets and Highways Code. Section 35271 requires the fil-
ing of written objections prior to the council hearing; because 
plaintiffs had failed to comply with this section, the objections 
were considered waived by virtue of the provisions of Govern-
ment Code section 35275. 
In City of Santa Monica v. Grubb,4 the petitioner adopted 
an ordinance authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds to 
finance the construction of a water treatment plant. The 
ordinance, however, excluded the provision of the state Reve-
nue Bond Law of 1941,5 which required an election to author-
i21e the issuance of revenue bonds. Respondent, as Clerk 
of the City of Santa Monica, had been directed to publish 
notice inviting sealed proposals for the purchase of the revenue 
bonds. He refused to issue the notice as directed because of 
the petitioners' failure to, among other things, comply with 
the election provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941. 
The court stated that a chartered city has the power to 
issue bonds subject only to the limitations imposed by its 
charter or by the California Constitution. The fact that a 
city, acting within the scope of its municipal affairs and pursu-
ant to its home-rule power, adopted only a portion of the 
provisions of the Revenue Bond Law of 1941 and did not 
adopt the requirement for an election to authorize the issuance 
of revenue bonds payable from a special fund, did not con-
stitute a violation of the provisions of Article XI, Section 18 
of the California Constitution. 
4. 245 Cal. App.2d 718, 54 Ca1. S. Ca1. Gov't Code §§ 54300 e/ seq. 
Rptr. 210 (1966). 
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3. Initiative and Referendum 
In Bragg v. City of Auburn,6 the district court affirmed the 
principle stated in Mervynne v. Acker7 that the power of 
initiative is not available to residents of a city to repeal 
parking meter ordinances. Without the initiative power, 
which is the power of the voters to place a measure on the 
ballot, the petitioners have no means to effect a change in 
the ordinance; while there is the possibility of referendum, 
this latter power is limited to the governing body. In Bragg, 
the petitioners, sponsors of an initiative petition, contended 
that the 1961 amendment to Vehicle Code section 22508, 
enacted after the Mervynne decision, was intended to restore 
"local" control to meter regulations, and thus limited the 
Mervynne decision. The court in Mervynne had held that 
regulation of public streets remained a matter of statewide 
concern, not a "municipal affair," and the power of initiative 
is not available to residents of a city to repeal parking meter 
ordinances. The 1961 amendment added the words, "any 
ordinance establishing a parking meter zone shall be subject 
to local referendum in the same manner as if such ordinance 
dealt with a matter of purely local concern." (Emphasis 
added. ) The suggestion, summarily rejected by the court, 
was that the addition of the language "purely local concern" 
modifies Mervynne, thereby also allowing an initiative peti-
tion. 
4. Elections 
In Farley v. Healey,S the California Supreme Court con-
sidered section 179 in the charter of the City and County 
of San Francisco, which provides: 
[R]egistered voters shall have the power to propose by 
petition, and to adopt or reject at the polls, any ordi-
nance, act or other measure which is within the power 
conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact, or 
6. 253 Cal. App.2d 45, 61 Cal. Rptr. 8. 67 Cal.2d 324, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26, 
284 (1967). 431 P.2d 650 (1967). 
7. 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 340 (1961). 
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any legislative act which is within the power conferred 
upon any other board, commission or officer to adopt, 
or any amendment to the charter. 
Any declaration of policy may be submitted to the 
electors in the manner provided for the submission of 
ordinances; and when approved by a majority of the 
qualified electors voting on said declaration, it shall 
thereupon be the duty of the board of supervisors to 
enact an ordinance or ordinances to carry out such poli-
cies or principles into effect, subject to the referendum 
provisions of this charter. 
The petitioners sought to place an initiative measure on the 
ballot urging a cease-fire and American withdrawal from 
Vietnam. The proposed measure read as follows: 
It is the policy of the people of the City and County of 
San Francisco that there be an immediate ceasefire and 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that the 
Vietnamese people can settle their own problems.9 
It was argued that the initiative could not be submitted to 
the electorate because it did not concern municipal affairs 
on which the board of supervisors could enact binding legis-
lation. The Supreme Court, however, found that the section 
of the charter quoted above was not so limited. The court 
pointed out that as representatives of local communities, 
boards of supervisors and city councils have traditionally made 
declarations of policies on matters of concern to the commu-
nity, whether or not they had power to effectuate such decla-
rations by binding legislation. This being the case, the ma-
jority of the court held that the proposed measure, assuming 
the sufficiency of signatures, should be placed on the ballot 
for the municipal election. Burke, J. and McComb, J. dis-
sented, pointing out that the obligation of the judiciary of 
this country is to interpret and apply the supreme law or 
sovereign will of the people, and that the court's failure to 
uphold the respondents in their refusal to permit municipal 
9. 67 Cal.2d at 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 
28,431 P.2d at 652. 
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elections to be used to legislate on issues exclusively federal 
in nature, is an abdication of that responsibility. 
5. Qualification of Bidders 
A determination by a public agency that only one bidder 
is qualified to carry out a redevelopment project is not subject 
to review by the appellate court in the absence of an abuse 
of discretion, fraud, collusion, or bad faith on the part of the 
public agency. In Old Town Development Corp. v. The 
Urban Renewal Agency,lO proposals were solicited by the 
Urban Renewal Agency, an agency of the City of Monterey, 
for the redevelopment of property embraced in the project 
referred to as the Custom House Redevelopment Project. A 
redevelopment plan had been adopted, an alternate plan pro-
posed, and a panel of experts was selected to review the quali-
fications of the prospective bidders. The party selected as the 
only qualified bidder was a party that failed to submit a pro-
posal on the adopted redevelopment plan. Notwithstanding 
this fact, however, the court pointed out that the other bidder 
had no legal cause for complaint since the agency could have 
rejected that bidder's bid even if qualified. Where the public 
agency reserves the right to reject all or any proposals in whole 
or in part, even if the agency errs in exercising its discretion, 
other bidders have no legal cause for complaint, since all 
bids could have been rejected. 
B. Counties 
1. Streets and Highways 
In Tucker v. Watkins/1 the plaintiff refused the defendant 
access to a county roadway that passed through plaintiff's 
land and onto that of the defendant. The trial court granted 
the plaintiff an injunction because the parties' predecessors 
in interest had dealt with the roadway as if it were abandoned, 
by exercising exclusive dominion over the parts of the roadway 
that crossed their respective properties. The appellate court 
10. 249 Cal. App.2d 313, 57 Cal. 11. 251 Cal. App.2d 327, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 426 (1967). Rptr. 453 (1967). 
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reversed, stating that a county road, once properly established, 
continues to exist until abandoned as prescribed by statute.12 
The fact that a portion of the road in question had not been 
used by the public since 1938, and the fact that the county 
had expended no funds for the improvement of the road, did 
not constitute an abandonment. 
Section 7901 of the California Public Utilities Code gives 
telephone and telegraph corporations the right to construct 
lines for telegraph or telephone along public roads or high-
ways. The court, in County of Los Angeles v. General Tele-
phone Company of California,13 interpreted the term "high-
way" in that section to include highways supported by bridges, 
thereby authorizing the telephone company to use county 
bridges without being liable to the county for any charge. 
2. Secret Meeting Law 
Only two cases were decided in which the "Secret Meeting 
Law" (The Brown Act) 14 was considered. As this was legis-
lation expressly inacted to insure that legislative action and 
deliberation be conducted openly, the holdings were in no way 
startling. In Letsch v. Northern San Diego County Hospital 
District,15 the court stated that where an executive session con-
cerning a personnel matter is held during a regular meeting of 
a public agency, and the action taken at the close of the execu-
tive session was taken at the regular meeting open to the 
public, there was no violation of the act. In Old Town Devel-
opment Corp. v. The Urban Renewal Agency,16 the alleged 
violation was summarily rejected for a failure to sufficiently 
allege a violation of secrecy. 
3. Public Records 
In Bruce v. Gregory,17 a taxpayer sought to compel a county 
tax collector to make certain tax records regularly available 
12. See Cal. Streets & Highways 
Code § 901. 
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 903, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 805 (1967). 
15. 246 Cal. App.2d 673, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 118 (1966). 
16. 249 Cal. App.2d 313, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 426 (1967). 
14. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 54950 et seq. 17. 65 Cal.2d 666, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
265, 423 P.2d 193 (1967). 
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for inspection. The case required construction of section 
1227 of the Government Code, which provides that public 
records in the office of any officer are subject to public inspec-
tion by any citizen of the state at all times during office hours. 
In addition, section 1892, Code of Civil Procedure, provides 
that every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of 
any public writing of this state. The court stated that a 
statute should not be given literal meaning if it would result 
in absurd consequences, since statutes are subject to implied 
rules of reason. A denial of inspection is proper only when 
necessary to prevent interference with a tax collector's office. 
In this case, the tax collector had rules for inspection, which 
were held to be reasonable. The records were available for 
inspection from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. daily. (The office 
was open from 8: 00 a.m. to 5: 00 p.m.) The records were 
inspected in a special section of the office and access to the 
records was restricted during July and August, preceding 
and following the December 10 and April 10 delinquency 
dates, and preceding tax sales. The court held that these 
limitations were reasonable. Justice Mosk dissented on the 
basis of statutory construction and pointed out that nothing 
in the statute gave the tax collector the right to restrict public 
inspection. The dissent, in effect, rejected the "implied rule 
of reason." 
4. Redistricting 
In Wiltsie v. Board of Supervisors/8 the Supreme Court of 
California once again considered the question whether the 
percentage of population in each supervisorial district was 
within allowable limits. The court cited Miller v. Board of 
Supervisors/9 which relied in part on section 25001 of the 
Government Code; the Code provides for a change of bound-
aries of supervisorial districts so that they will be as nearly 
equal in population as possible. Section 25001 finds a pre-
sumption of validity in the districting of a county where no 
district is more than 23 percent or less than 17 percent of 
18. 65 Cal.2d 314, 54 Cal. Rptr. 19. 63 Cal.2d 343, 46 Cal. Rptr. 617, 
320,419 P.2d 440 (1966). 405 P.2d 857 (1965). 
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the overall population of the county (a population ratio of 
1.35 to 1). In the instant case, the percentage of population 
among the districts ranged from 9.8 percent to 33.9 percent, 
a population ratio between the most and least populated dis-
tricts of 3.46 to 1. Since the population distribution failed 
to meet the standards of the Miller case, and there was no 
sufficient factor existing to command any particular division 
in the county, the Court required redistricting. 
The appellate court, in Thompson v. Board of Directors,20 
considered the question of whether a board of directors of 
an irrigation district was compelled to change the boundaries 
of the divisions within the district, where the percentage of 
total popUlation for the divisions ranged from 7 percent to 35 
percent. The question considered was whether the "one man, 
one vote" doctrine of the federal apportionment cases applies 
to an irrigation district. The court determined that the appli-
cation of the doctrine to a special district depends on such 
factors as the purpose of the district, the nature of its functions, 
and the manner in which they are exercised. It stated that 
if the principal purpose of the district is to provide a service 
that can be provided by a private or quasi-public corporation 
(for example, a public utility company), and if the district 
does not exercise general powers of government, it is not 
subject to the "one man, one vote" rule. The court concluded 
that the irrigation district possessed none of the essential 
characteristics that would require the application of the "one 
man, one vote" doctrine. The court pointed out, however, 
that section 21605 of the Water Code states that the board 
of directors of an irrigation district may change boundaries 
of the divisions when the board deems it advisable and in 
the best interests of the district to do so. The court stated 
that the word "may" in that section does not grant unlimited 
discretion to act. 1 The court then compelled the redistricting 
of the divisions within the district because of the abuse of 
discretion shown by the board's drastic deviations in popu-
lation ratios among the divisions. 
20. 247 Cal. App.2d 587, 55 Cal. 1. See Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 
Rptr. 689 (1967). 60 Cal.2d 318, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101, 384 
P.2d 421 (1963). 
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EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
A. Discharge Cases 
In Wisuri v. Newark School District of Alameda County,S 
the court dealt with section 13583 of the Education Code, 
which, prior to its repeal, required an employment contract 
for classified employees, who are defined in section 13581 of 
the Education Code as full-time noncertified employees. The 
court stated that a permanent employee in the classified service 
of a school district can be discharged only for cause and 
after a hearing. The district distributed to each employee, 
upon hiring, a handbook describing the rules and regulations 
governing employment. The handbook did not contain those 
provisions normally included in a contract of employment. 
The court found that the district would be bound by the 
common ordinary meaning of the word "permanent," and 
required the plaintiff to be afforded a hearing. The court 
stated that by construing the handbook as a contract, the 
handbook described plaintiff's classified position as being per-
manent, and, therefore, he was subject to dismissal for cause 
only. The court further stated that a notice of intent to 
dismiss an employee in the classified service of a school district 
is sufficient if it adequately informs the employee of the charges 
against him so that he may prepare a defense and not be sur-
prised at the hearings. 
In another discharge case, Board of Trustees v. Hartman,S 
the court stated that cohabitation with a married woman who 
had left her husband, and later cohabitation with another 
woman, is sufficient cause to dismiss a certified teacher for 
immoral conduct and unfitness for service. 
B. Transfer Cases 
In American Federation of Teachers v. Oakland Unified 
School District,4 a teacher was transferred from his teaching 
2. 247 Cal. App.2d 239, 55 Cal. 4. 251 Cal. App.2d 91, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 490 (1966). Rptr. 85 (1967). 
3. 246 Cal. App.2d 756, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 144 (1966). 
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position in one high school to a similar position in another 
high school. The transfer was set aside on the basis that 
the school district failed to comply with the provisions of an 
administrative bulletin adopted pursuant to the authority of 
section 925 of the Education Code. The court stated that 
the rules and regulations adopted by a board of education 
are, in effect, a part of a teacher's employment contract and the 
teacher is entitled to enforcement.s 
C. Conduct of Public Employees: Political and Union Activi-
ties 
In Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella,6 the em-
ployment of a chief of police was terminated because of his 
membership and participation in union activities. Since the 
chief was appointed and held office at the pleasure of the 
city council/ the court stated that he had no vested right 
to retain his employment. The court continued, however, 
that it does not follow that the power to terminate his services 
is an unbridled one, free of all legal restraints. Where the 
dismissal of a public employee indicates that it resulted from 
the exercise by the employee of a constitutional right, the 
courts are empowered to review the dismissal. The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court's finding that the action of the 
city council in firing the police chief was arbitrary and illegal 
in that it deprived the employee of his rights under Govern-
ment Code sections 3500 et seq. The power to terminate a 
public employee's services without cause and without notice 
S. The tenure of a school teacher, 
however does not bestow on the teacher 
a vested right to teach at a specific 
school or to teach a specific class level 
of students. See Adelt v. Richmond 
School District, 250 Cal. App.2d 149, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1967). But where 
a teacher was transferred from class-
room teaching to home teaching for the 
reason that the teacher wore a beard 
and was not, therefore, setting a good 
example for the students in school, the 
transfer will be set aside. The court 
stated in Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. 
of Ed. 250 Cal. App.2d 189, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 520 (1967) that the teacher has 
a constitutional right to wear a beard. 
See Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in 
this volume. 
6. 252 Cal. App.2d 136, 60 Cal. 
Rptr. 139 (1967). 
7. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 36505-36506. 
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or a hearing may not be exercised arbitrarily in disregard of 
the employee's constitutiona18 or statutory rights.9 
D. Salaries and Wages 
In Cosgrove v. County of Sacrament% the court consid-
ered a charter provision of the County of Sacramento, which 
reads as follows: 
In fixing compensation, the Board of Supervisors shall 
at least annually, by ordinance, provide in each instance 
for the payment of not less than the prevailing or gen-
eral current rate of compensation or wages paid by 
private employers in the County of Sacramento for sim-
ilar quality or quantity of service, in case such prevailing 
compensation or wages can be ascertained. Preference 
in all cases shall be given to Sacramento County resi-
dents. 
A salary ordinance was passed for the year 1963, to which 
the petitioners took objection. The superior court issued 
a writ of mandate directing the board of supervisors to re-
examine available data and to procure new data, if necessary, 
in order to determine prevailing salaries and wages in private 
employment in Sacramento County. Later, the superior court 
determined that the county had complied with the writ of 
mandate. The appellate court stated that the board of super-
visors, as the legislative branch of the government in the 
county, is entitled to the exercise of discretion in judging 
facts that constitute the basis of its resolutions and ordinances. 
There is little, if any, leeway left to the appellate court to 
control the action of the trial court where the trial court had 
before it substantial evidence on which to act. The court 
therefore affirmed the action of the trial court and determined 
that the county had complied with the writ of mandate. 
8. Bagley v. Washington Township 
Hospital District, 65 Cal.2d 499, 55 
Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966). 
For further discussion of this case, see 
Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, in this 
volume. 
438 CAL LAW 1967 
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The court in Sanders v. City of Los Angelesll had before it 
a similar charter provision in the Charter of the City of Los 
Angeles. A salary survey was made by the city administrative 
officer and thereafter the council adopted an ordinance fixing 
the salaries. The mayor vetoed the ordinance, and the council 
failed to override the veto. No salary increases were provided 
for that year. The appellate court found that the city ignored 
the salary data evidence gathered, which established that in 
many of the city jobs, salary increases were due. The court 
pointed out that this was not only an abuse of discretion, 
but also a flagrant breach of duty, and reversed the order dis-
charging a writ of mandate. 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
A. Inverse Condemnation 
Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo12 came to the appellate 
court on the question of whether a cause of action had been 
stated in the complaint against the defendant county. Plain-
tiff had purchased land that was zoned A-I, permitting a 
density of one residential dwelling per acre. The plaintiff 
submitted a tentative subdivision map requesting that the 
County Planning Commission rezone the property to R-I, 
a zoning under which the maximum allowable density of resi-
dential structures per acre would be increased from one to 
five. The planning commission, however, after a review, 
recommended a zoning of A-I-5, a classification requiring 5 
acres per single-family dwelling. The board of supervisors 
accepted the recommendation and rezoned the area to A-I-5. 
The court stated that the complaint failed to allege that the 
ordinance establishing the zoning was a property-taking de-
vice rather than a regulation of the use of land, and cited 
Anderson v. City Council13 to reaffirm the proposition that 
landowners have no vested right in existing or anticipated 
11. 252 Cal. App.2d 531, 60 Cal. 13. 229 Cal. App.2d 79, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 539 (1967). Rptr. 41 (1964). 
12. 247 Cal. App.2d 600, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 710 (1967). 
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zoning ordinances. Unless the complaining party pleads facts 
to show that an ordinance is unreasonable as a matter of law, 
a court will neither presume the invalidity of a zoning ordi-
nance nor consider the substitution of its judgment on the 
issue of zoning for that of the public authority. 
Also of interest is Smith v. County of San Diego,14 where 
the court held that although an owner of land abutting a 
highway is not entitled to access at all points along his bound-
ary, destruction of a right of access by the construction of a 
drainage ditch on a highway easement owned by a public 
agency may give rise to damages for inverse condemnation. 
B. Damages 
In County of Santa Clara v. Curtner,15 the county con-
demned property for freeway purposes. The property owner 
claimed and was awarded severance damages. The county 
appealed the award of severance damages on the grounds that 
it included damages that resulted from a plan adopted by the 
City of Mountain View to relocate certain streets closed by 
the county's construction of the freeway. The court stated 
that the property owners were entitled to severance damages 
resulting from the county condemnation proceedings to the 
extent that the fair market value of the remainder of their 
property was depreciated, but that any damages accruing to 
the landowners by the action of the City of Mountain View 
must be compensated for by the city and not the county. 
The court in Community Redevelopment Agency v. Hen-
derson16 held that in arriving at a determination of the market 
value of land subject to condemnation, it is improper to 
consider the increase in the value of such land by reason of 
the proposed improvements to be made by the party con-
demning the land. Sales of property used in forming an 
expert's opinion of valuation, to be admissible, must be sales 
of property similar to the property being condemned, but need 
14. 252 Cal. App.2d 466, 60 Cal. 16. 251 Cal. App.2d 336, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 602 (1967). Rptr. 311 (1967). 
15. 245 Cal. App.2d 730, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 257 (1966). 
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not be identical. The factors that should be considered in 
determining such similarity are a combination of time, asso-
ciation, character, size, suitability, usability, and improve-
ments. Where there is conflicting evidence on the probability 
of a zone change, it is proper to leave the issue of such prob-
ability to the jury to be considered in reaching the valuation of 
the property.17 
In People ex reZ. Department of Public Works v. VaUejos,18 
appellants contended that by allowing the state to take one 
of the streets bordering the appellant's property for a freeway 
off-ramp, the county had abandoned that street, and that the 
appellants, as owners of the adjacent property, were entitled 
to the unencumbered fee out to the middle of the former street. 
Appellants were awarded damages for their loss of access, 
but not for the loss of their alleged unencumbered fee. The 
court stated that where streets are closed at or near their 
intersection with any freeway pursuant to sections 100.2 and 
941.2 of the Streets and Highways Code, there is no "abandon-
ment," and therefore there can be no reversion of the easement 
to the owner of the underlying fee as would be the case under 
sections 954 and 960.2 of the Streets and Highways Code. 
This being the case, the owner of the fee was not entitled 
to compensation for the taking where the fee was burdened 
with an easement that the county had transferred to the 
state and that had not been abandoned or extinguished. Due 
to the burden of the easement, the underlying fee was of 
nominal value only. Where evidence of value is remote, 
speculative, or conjectural, it is inadmissible as evidence of 
proof of fair market value of land.19 
17. See also People ex rei. Dept. Pub. 
Works v. Arthofer, 245 Cal. App.2d 
454,54 Cal. Rptr 878 (1966). 
18. 251 Cal. App.2d 414, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 450 (1967). 
19. See City of Santa Cruz v. Wood, 
252 Cal. App.2d 52, 60 Cal. Rptr. 26 
(1967). 
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POLICE POWER 
A. Ordinances Regulating Conduct 
1. Drinking 
The court, in People v. Butler,20 considered an ordinance 
making it a misdemeanor to drink beer, wine, or other intoxi-
cating beverages on any street, sidewalk, alley, highway, or 
playground. The issue was whether the state had exclusively 
preempted the field and therefore prohibited the city from 
passing legislation concerned with the consumption of alcohol 
in the streets. The court pointed out that state law proscribes 
the drinking of liquor in a vehicle on a public highway,! drink-
ing on public school grounds, 2 drinking on licensed or un-
licensed premises,3 and drinking by minors in anyon-sale 
licensed premises.4 The court stated that by the adoption 
of such selective laws, the legislature did not intend to say 
that it had covered all those areas wherein the consumption 
of alcoholic beverages might create police problems. Unless 
the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered 
by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclu-
sively a matter of state concern, or the subject matter has 
been partially covered by general law couched in such terms 
as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will 
not tolerate further or additional local action, or the subject 
matter has been partially covered by general law and the sub-
ject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordi-
nance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the pos-
sible benefits of the municipality, then the municipality may 
adopt regulatory legislation. The court held that the state had 
not preempted the entire field of consumption of alcoholic 
beverages and that the provisions of the municipal code were 
not exclusively a matter of statewide concern, and it thereby 
upheld the ordinance in question. 
20. 252 Cal. App.2d Supp. 772, 59 3. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 25632 
Cal. Rptr. 924 (1967). and 25604. 
1. Cal. Vehicle Code § 23121. 4. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25658. 
2. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25606. 
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2 . "Topless" Entertainment 
In Carolina Lanes, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,5 the appel-
late court was confronted with an ordinance that, in part, 
prohibited striptease acts in bowling alleys and poolrooms. 
The court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional, 
since the purpose of the ordinance was not the regulation of 
sexual conduct, but an attempt to safeguard the peace, health, 
safety, convenience, morals, and welfare of minors attracted 
to plaintiff's bowling establishment. 
Whether or not the presence of a topless waitress constituted 
entertainment was considered in People v. Kukkanen.6 The 
ordinance required that a written permit be obtained before 
any person could operate any public place where food or 
beverages were sold or any form of live entertainment pro-
vided, and stated that any female attendant who was topless 
was included in the term "live entertainment." The court 
pointed out that the licensing of live entertainment is a field 
that is not preempted by the state, and found that the presence 
of a topless waitress was, in fact, "entertainment." 
In People v. Hansen,7 the court considered a municipal 
ordinance that prohibited topless waitresses because of an 
alleged health problem that the ordinance was designed to 
correct.s The court found that the ordinance was a regula-
tion of sexual activity, and therefore was preempted by the 
state. 
In Robins v. County of Los Angeles,9 the trial court en-
joined the defendant county from enforcing a county ordi-
5. 253 Cal. App.2d 930, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
630 (1967). 
6. 248 Cal. App.2d Supp. 899, 56 
Cal. Rptr. 620 (1967). 
7. 245 Cal. App.2d 689, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 311 (1966). 
8. The prosecution's argument may 
have had more validity than the court 
accorded it. See footnote 3, People v. 
Kukkanen, 248 Cal. App.2d Supp. at 
905, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (App. Dept. 
Sup. Ct. 1967). See also Bellflower 
Mun. Code § 5108, ord. #204. 
9. 248 Cal. App.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 
853 (1966). 
The Robins opinion was by Division 
1 of the Court of Appeal for the 
Second Appellate District; the Justices 
disagreed with their brethern of Divi-
sion 4, who had decided the Hansen 
case. The Robins court doubted that 
"criminal sexual activity associated 
with the public display of the naked 
human body has been preempted by 
state law." 
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nance requiring restaurants and bars employing topless wait-
resses to obtain an entertainment license. This order was 
reversed by the appellate court on the basis that the action 
of respondents seeking an injunction was premature. The 
court pointed out that one who is required to take out a li-
cense will not be heard to complain, in advance of making 
an application, that there is a danger of refusal. The court 
stated further that entertainment licenses are a valid source 
of revenue to finance the expenses of regulating problems 
arising in the conduct of establishments offering entertain-
ment. 
3. Streets and Highways 
Ratkovich v. City of San Brundo dealt with an ordinance 
that regulated trucking on the city streets, by providing in 
substance that, with the exception of certain streets marked 
as truck routes, the use, operation, and maintenance on all 
remaining city streets of any vehicle or truck of a gross weight 
of 27,000 pounds or more is unlawful. Vehicles hauling 
materials exceeding the maximum weight limits were per-
mitted to file an application with the city clerk after the 
payment of a filing fee. The permit, when issued, required 
that 2 cents per ton be paid to the city for the privilege of 
using the streets. The stated purpose of the fee was to estab-
lish a fund to be used for the repair of damages done to the 
city streets by vehicles carrying excessive loads. The trial 
court found that the city did not at any time make any repairs 
to the street in question for any damages caused by the 
plaintiff. The appellate court, however, upheld the ordinance 
and pointed out that the plaintiff presented no evidence to 
show that the city's regulations for waiving the weight limi-
tations were unreasonable or arbitrary, or that heavy loads 
could have no possible effect on the pavement, or that there 
was no rational support for the 2-cents-per-ton charge. The 
court further pointed out that in the exercise of its police 
power, a legislative body is vested with a broad discretion to 
10. 245 Cal. App.2d 870, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 333 (1966). 
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determine not only what the public interests require, but what 
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. 
It was held that the inquiry of the court is limited to deter-
mining whether the object of the ordinance is one for which 
the police power may properly be invoked, and if so, whether 
the ordinance bears a reasonable and substantial relation to 
the objects sought to be obtained. 
PLANNING AND ZONING 
A. Conditional Use Permits 
The court upheld a conditional use permit that required a 
landowner to grant to the city, without compensation, an ease-
ment for road purposes in Gong v. City of Fremont.ll The 
court stated that it could announce no holding concerning 
the validity of the conditions attached to the use permit, 
because that issue had not yet been properly presented to the 
trial court. The court, however, observed that the imposition 
of conditions upon the granting of a use permit is at worst 
equivalent to a denial of the permit, and the courts have no 
authority to interfere with the denial of a variance or use 
permit except on a clear and convincing showing of fraud, 
illegality, or abuse of discretion. The court commented that 
conditions requiring dedication of land for street purposes 
had been repeatedly upheld in the absence of a showing of 
fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion. 
B. Billboards 
After discussing the history of planning and zoning laws, 
the court, in County of Santa Barbara v. Purcell, Inc.,12 stated 
that the legislature, by the adoption of the Outdoor Adver-
tising Act,13 intended that local governments might still reg-
ulate billboards under zoning laws. The ordinance in ques-
tion limited the size and character of signs and advertising 
11. 250 Cal. App.2d 568, 58 Cal. 12. 251 Cal. App.2d 169, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 664 (1967). Rptr. 345 (1967). 
13. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5227. 
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structures, and stated that nonconforming outdoor advertis-
ing signs or structures could remain on the property for 5 
years from the date of the adoption of the ordinance. The 
defendant contended that the ordinance was based upon 
aesthetics, and that zoning laws may be used only to protect 
economic interests, and not to "preserve the priceless beauty 
of a countryside for all men.,,14 The court stated that it was 
unnecessary to meet that argument, for in Santa Barbara 
County, scenic environment is commercial, since people come 
to the county because of its natural beauty. Therefore, the 
maintenance of billboards may reasonably be believed to have 
an adverse effect upon that economy. 
C. Retroactive Zoning Regulations 
In an action to determine the constitutionality of a retro-
active zoning ordinance, the court in Melton v. City of San 
Pablo15 stated that if the necessity or propriety of a zoning 
regulation is a question on which reasonable minds might 
differ, the legislative determination will not be disturbed. 
Where there are considerations of public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare that the legislative body may have 
had in mind, and that would justify the regulations, it must 
be assumed by the court that the legislative body had those 
considerations in mind, and that those considerations justified 
the regulation. The ordinance in question required all port-
able or temporary vending establishments to obtain a use 
permit. The plaintiff operated a restaurant in a remodeled 
bus located in a commercially zoned area. The court found 
that the ordinance was aimed at preventing not only unsafe 
or dangerous use of the property, but also an untidy appear-
ance and a diminution of property values that might attend 
the unregulated parking and use of old vehicles at commercial 
establishments in commercially zoned areas. The court 
pointed out that the principle of neighborhood aesthetics is 
related to property values, and is a proper subject of zoning 
where such aesthetics bear in a substantial way on the utiliza-
14. 251 Cal. App.2d at 173, 59 Cal. 15. 252 Cal. App.2d 862, 61 Clil. 
Rptr. at 348. Rptr. 29 (1967). 
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tion of land. Insofar as the retrospective application of the 
ordinance, the court pointed out that ex post facto clauses 
of both the State and Federal Constitutions apply only to 
criminal statutes punishing conduct committed prior to their 
enactment. The court stated further that the state's inherent 
sovereign power includes the right to interfere with vested 
rights whenever reasonably necessary for the protection, 
health, safety, morals, and the well-being of the people. 
D. Variances 
The Supreme Court stated, in Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo 
Association v. Board of Permit Appeals/6 that the presump-
tion that an agency's rulings rest on the necessary findings 
and that such findings are supported by substantial evidence, 
does not apply to agencies who must expressly state their 
findings and must set forth the relevant supporting facts. The 
court, in citing Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. Board of 
Permit Appeals,17 stated that in a mandate proceeding to 
review the granting of a variance, the variance order may be 
sustained only if the board's findings suffice to establish com-
pliance with all of the statutory criteria and are supported 
by substantial evidence in the record. The court distinguished 
Siller v. Board of Supervisors. 1s The Siller case stands for the 
proposition that a zoning board's action in granting a variance 
must be sustained in the absence of a clear and convincing 
showing of arbitrariness or caprice. The court pointed out 
that in Siller, the board was not required by its governing 
provisions to specify its findings and ultimate conclusions. 
In the instant case, however, the code provided for five condi-
tions that had to be met in order to obtain the variance. 
The zoning administrator found none of these conditions to 
exist, and the court, upon review, found that only three of 
the conditions existed. Since there was no specific finding 
Gill all of the conditions, as required by the planning code, 
16. 66 Cal.2d 767, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146, 18. 58 Cal.2d 479, 25 Cal. Rptr. 73, 
427 P.2d 810 (1967). 375 P.2d 41 (1962). 
17. 245 Cal. App.2d 160, 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 610 (1966). 
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the court granted a writ of mandate compelling the Board of 
Permit Appeals to reverse its decision granting a variance. 
E. Building Permits 
In Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Per-
mit Appeals,19 the controversy involved an attempt by the 
Board of Permit Appeals to authorize the construction of a 
building that would rise to over twice the height permitted 
by the governing ordinances of the City and County of San 
Francisco. The court held that even though the permit had 
been approved by the planning commission, it was not final 
until the 10-day appeal period provided by statute had elapsed, 
and, since the permit application was still pending before the 
Board of Permit Appeals when the new height limitation be-
came effective, the permit was not "granted" in time to confer 
immunity under section 150 of the City of San Francisco 
Planning Code.20 The code states that any building for which 
a permit has been lawfully "granted" prior to the effective 
date of an amendment to the code may be completed and 
used in accordance with approved plans, provided that the 
construction is started and diligently prosecuted to comple-
tion, and it shall thereafter be deemed to be a lawfully exist-
ing building or use. The restrictive ordinance in question 
became effective after the permit had been issued by the plan-
ning commission but before the appeal period had elapsed and 
the permit became final. 
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AGENCIES 
A. Filing of Claims 
1. Late Claims 
In Viles v. State of California,! the plaintiff was erroneously 
informed by an insurance adjuster that he had 1 year to bring 
19. 66 Cal.2d 34, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 1. 66 Cal.2d 24, 56 Cal. Rptr. 666, 
423 P.2d 824 (1967). 423 P.2d 818 (1967). 
20. City of San Francisco Planning 
Code § 150. 
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an action for wrongful death, when the claim was subject 
to a claim statute that required the claim to be presented not 
later than 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action.2 
The court found that there was no prejudice to the public 
agency since the accident had been fully investigated, and the 
failure to file the claim within the 100-day period was excused. 
Burke, J. dissented on the ground that the only asserted mis-
take was one of law, and stated that this decision would 
open the door to evasion and eventual erosion of the claims 
legislation for all practical purposes. 
In Tammen v. County of San Diego,3 the cause of action 
accrued on February 18, 1963. The 1963 Tort Claims Act/ 
with its 100-day statute of limitations, had become effective 
September 20, 1963. By its own terms, the Tort Claims Act 
applied to all causes of action "heretofore or hereafter accru-
ing." In view of this provision of the act, the 100-day limi-
tation commenced on September 20, 1963, and expired on 
December 30, 1963. Plaintiffs presented a claim to the board 
of supervisors on January 8, 1964, which was rejected, and 
thereafter unsuccessfully applied to the county for leave to 
present a late claim. Section 912 of the Government Code 
provides, in part, that the superior court shall grant leave to 
file a late claim, unless the public entity establishes that it 
would be prejudiced if leave to present the claim were granted, 
if the court finds that the application to the board to file a 
late claim was made within a reasonable time, not to exceed 
1 year after the accrual of the cause of action, and that the 
failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect. The superior court denied the 
petition, and found the application to the board had not been 
made within a reasonable time and that the plaintiff's failure 
to present her claim had not been excusable. The appellate 
court, in affirming the lower court decision, pointed out that 
the showing required under Government Code section 912 
2. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2. In 3. 66 Cal.2d 468, 58 Cal. Rptr. 249, 
1965, section 912 was repealed, and a 426 P.2d 753 (1967). 
new procedure for obtaining judicial 4. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 900 et seq. 
relief is set forth in section 946.6 of 
the Government Code. 
29 CAL LAW 1967 449 23
McKinstry: State and Local Government
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967
State and Local Government 
to establish mistake or inadvertence as a ground for a leave 
to file a late claim against the county is the same as the showing 
required under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
for relieving a party from a default judgment. The court 
went on to state that the controlling factor in obtaining relief 
from a mistake of law is the reasonableness of the miscon-
ception of the law under the circumstances as viewed by the 
trial court. The refusal to grant relief is within the trial 
court's discretion, and the appellate court will not disturb 
the lower court's finding, without a showing of abuse of that 
discretion. 5 
In another case dealing with an attorney's error, in which 
a claim should have been filed on or before April 7, 1964, 
but was actually filed on May 19, 1964, the court held that 
a calendaring error in the attorney's office was excusable neg-
lect within the provisions of section 912(b) (1). There was 
no showing that the city would have been prejudiced by allow-
ing the late claim to be filed. 6 
2. Filing a Claim Required 
In an action to recover damages for extra work and mate-
rials furnished in connection with the construction of a high-
way, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies against the State of California as a pre-
requisite to the filing and pursuing of a claim against the 
county. The contention in Calabrese v. County of Monterey7 
was that the cause of action did not accrue until the admin-
istrative remedies against the State Board of Control had been 
exhausted. The fact that the plaintiff was, in part, mis-
informed by state officials could not be used by the plaintiff 
as an excuse for failing to comply with the time requirements 
for filing a verified claim for money damages against the 
county. In this case, involving a federally aided secondary 
development project, the state supervised the project and 
5. See also, Garcia v. City & County 249 Cal. App.2d 976, 58 Cal. Rptr. 20 
of San Francisco, 250 Cal. App.2d (1967). 
767, 58 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1967). 7. 251 Cal. App.2d 131, 59 Cal. Rptr. 
6. Nilsson v. City of Los Angeles, 224 (1967). 
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awarded the construction contract, but was only a nominal 
contracting party. The county was the real party in interest. 
Extra compensation would have had to be paid out of county 
funds; therefore a claim had to be filed with the county. 
The claim, of course, must be filed with the proper govern-
mental agency, and in a case where a claim was filed with 
the city rather than the school board, the doctrine of "substan-
tial compliance" was held to be not applicable.8 
In Miller v. Hoagland,9 a city attorney, representing a city 
that had been a party to a lawsuit,lO was sued by the plaintiff 
for money damages. In the prior action, the attorney had 
written a letter to the judge, which was alleged in this action 
to contain slanderous statements. The plaintiff failed to file 
a claim against the city and a judgment sustaining a demurrer 
to the complaint without leave to amend was affirmed. It 
was alleged by the plaintiff in the later action that the attorney 
had acted outside the scope of his employment in writing this 
letter. The court found that the attorney had been acting 
in his official capacity as the legal advisor to the city and 
was therefore not subject to suit. Under the claim law,ll in 
order to obtain relief the plaintiff would have had to file a 
claim against the city, which he failed to do, and a judgment 
sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to 
amend was affirmed. 
B. Liability for Torts 
The concept of civil immunity for a "discretionary act" by 
a public official, provided for in section 820.2 of the Govern-
ment Code, was considered in the case of Burgdorf v. Funder. 12 
The plaintiff sued a state official for libel based upon a letter 
containing alleged defamatory statements. The letter was 
sent to the plaintiff by the tax collector, advising the plaintiff 
that his claim was considered excessive and therefore the 
8. See Jackson v. Board of Educa- Cal.2d 93, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889, 410 P.2d 
tion, 250 Cal. App.2d 856, 58 Cal. 393 (1966). 
Rptr. 763 (1967). 11. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 950.2 and 
9. 247 Cal. App.2d 57, 55 Cal. Rptr. 911.2. 
311 (1966). 12. 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 54 Cal. 
10. City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 Rptr. 805 (1966). 
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state was refusing to make a tax refund. The court, in sus-
taining a judgment of dismissal, stated that it was reasonably 
apparent from the pleadings that the defendant had exercised 
his judgment in passing on the plaintiff's claim for a tax 
refund, and that the defendant was protected when acting 
within the scope of his authority, even if the defendant had 
exercised poor judgment or abused his discretion. The court 
pointed out that since there was an insufficient showing that 
the official was acting outside the course and scope of his 
employment, the plaintiff was required to file a claim for dam-
ages within the time limits prescribed by statute. 
In Sanders v. County of Yuba,13 the plaintiff, an inmate in 
defendant's county jail, received an eye injury as a result 
of coming in contact with a towel rack attached to his bed. 
The court was faced with the problem of reconciling sections 
845.6 and 844.6 of the Government Code. Section 845.6 
provides that the public entity will be liable if an employee 
of the entity or the entity has reason to know that a prisoner 
is in need of immediate medical care and thereafter fails to 
take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Section 
844.6 states, in part, that notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of law, a public entity is not liable for an injury to 
any prisoner. The court reasoned that section 844.6 intended 
a public entity not to be liable for an impact type of injury. 
In other words, the county would not be liable for the injury 
that occurred to the plaintiff when he originally injured his 
eye. However, under section 845.6, the defendant county 
would be liable when an employee knows or has reason to 
know of the need of immediate medical care and fails to 
summon such care. Liability attached, therefore, not as a 
result of the original injury, but for the failure to provide 
medical attention. 
The court also considered section 844.6 of the Government 
Code in the case of Garcia v. State of California.14 In that 
case, a prisoner had died of injuries received by the collapse 
of certain equipment at a state prison. His surviving wife 
13. 247 Cal. App.2d 748, 55 Cal. 14. 247 Cal. App.2d 814, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 852 (1967). Rptr. 80 (1967). 
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and children brought an action for wrongful death. It was 
the state's position that since the prisoner could have no cause 
of action under section 844.6( a) (2), the heirs could have 
no cause of action. The court relied on subsection (c), which 
states: 
Nothing in this section prevents a person, other than a 
prisoner, from recovering from the public entity for an 
injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public 
property under Chapter 2 (commencing with § 830) of 
this part ... , 
and section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure/5 and held 
that the heirs had the right to recover damages by reason of 
the decedent's wrongful death, assuming proof establishing a 
dangerous condition on public property. 
In Gardner v. City oj San Jose,16 the plaintiff was injured 
while crossing a heavily traveled, unmarked intersection. The 
court concluded that a subway, constructed for the purpose 
of providing a passage under the street, was unlighted and 
in an unsanitary condition, thus constituting a dangerous con-
dition that forced the plaintiff to cross the intersection at street 
level. The dangerous condition of the subway and the lack 
of crosswalks in the intersection created in effect a trap for 
the pedestrian, and both driver and pedestrian could have 
claimed a right-of-way according to the provisions of the 
Vehicle Code.17 Draper, J. dissented on the basis that the 
subway was not a dangerous condition within the contempla-
tion of sections 830 and 835 of the Government Code, as 
there was no evidence that the plaintiff's election not to use 
the subway was occasioned by the condition of the subway. 
In Sava v. Fuller/s the court stated that the rule in Muskopf 
v. Corning Hospital District/9 that "when there is negligence, 
the rule is liability, immunity is the exception," had been 
15. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377 pro-
vides for suit for wrongful death by or 
against heirs or personal representatives. 
16. 248 Cal. App.2d 798, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 176 (1967). 
17. Cal. Vehicle Code § 21953. 
18. 249 Cal. App.2d 281, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 312 (1967). 
19. 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 
89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961), modified 57 
Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 
325 (1962). 
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reversed by the adoption of the Tort Claims Act of 1963. 
Now immunity is the rule, and the exceptions are to be found 
in the act. The court considered the meaning of "exercise 
the discretion vested in him" as found in section 820.2, which 
grants governmental immunity to public employees when they 
are acting within the scope of their authority. In Sava, a 
state botanist was alleged to have negligently analyzed a plant 
substance, thereby causing the death of a child. The court 
reversed a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer was sus-
tained without leave to amend, and stated that the botanist 
had exercised his discretion when he agreed to analyze the 
substance and thereafter liability would attach if he failed to 
use ordinary care in making his analysis. The court cited 
Morgan v. County of Yuba,20 a case where a sheriff had 
repeatedly been told a man threatened to kill the deceased. 
The sheriff failed to give the warning to the victim and the 
man who had threatened him carried out his threat. The 
court stated in that case that the sheriff could not claim dis-
cretionary immunity as a defense. Once he had promised to 
act, he had already exercised his discretion and, by failing to 
give the promised warning, he negligently omitted to perform 
an act voluntarily assumed. 
In Callahan v. City and County of San Francisco, an injury 
occurred on a street maintained by the defendant city that 
was undergoing maintenance work by an independent con-
tractor who had agreed to post warning devices on the street.l 
The court stated that where an activity involving possible 
danger to the public is carried on under public authority, 
the one engaging in the activity may not delegate to an inde-
pendent contractor the duties or liability imposed on him by 
public authority. Government Code section 830.8, declaring 
public entities immune from liability for injuries caused by the 
failure to provide traffic or warning signals, signs, markings, 
or devices described in the Vehicle Code, is inapplicable when 
a warning sign is necessary to warn of a concealed trap. 
20. 230 Cal. App.2d 938, 41 Cal. 1. 249 Cal. App.2d 696, 57 CaL 
Rptr. 508 (1964). Rptr. 639 (1967). 
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In Hibbs v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District,2 
the issue was whether the failure of the defendants to fence 
a waterway that passed through a residential area containing 
an elementary school amounted to the maintenance of a dan-
gerous condition. The court stated that the defendant could 
have reasonably anticipated that children would play in and 
about the area, even though the storm drain was not con-
structed for that purpose.3 Since evidence that the actual 
use of the area as a play area was known to the defendant, 
judgment for the defendant was reversed. 
The claim of discretionary immunity as a defense under 
section 820.2 of the Government Code was disallowed in 
Scruggs v. Haynes/ where a police officer used unreasonable 
force in making an arrest. The court stated that discretionary 
immunity does not automatically operate to protect a police 
officer from every error of judgment. 
Section 830.6 of the Government Code was considered in 
the case of Cabell v. State of California. 5 A student was 
injured while attempting to open a glass door in a dormitory 
building. He injured his hand when it slipped and went 
through the glass in the door. The defendant relied on the 
immunity granted by section 830.6. Plaintiff contended that 
since the adoption of the plans and specifications that ap-
proved the construction of the doors, glass had been broken 
and replaced with glass of the same specifications as required 
under the original plans. Plaintiff contended that this con-
stituted a maintenance of a dangerous condition by the de-
fendant to which the plan or design immunity does not apply. 
The court pointed out that as long as the maintenance was 
in conformity with the original plans and specifications, the 
reasonableness of the adoption or approval of plans must be 
measured as of the time of such adoption, and the immunity 
2. 252 Cal. App.2d 166,60 Cal. Rptr. pose for which the entity permitted or 
364 (1967). intended the property to be used. 
3. See Cal. Gov't Code § 831.8, 4. 252 Cal. App.2d 271, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
which provides a public entity with im- 355 (1967). 
munity from liability for the conditions 5. 67 Cal.2d 174, 60 Cal. Rptr. 476, 
of its reservoirs if the person injured 430 P.2d 34 (1967). 
was not using the property for a pur-
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of section 830.6 would apply. In his dissenting opinion, Jus-
tice Peters stated that the discretionary immunity of section 
830.6 was intended to be an immunity similar to the immunity 
granted by judicial decision in New York, which held that plan 
and design immunity was not intended to apply to negligent 
maintenance after the agency was on notice that the improve-
ment created a dangerous condition.6 
In Becker v. Johnston,7 the plaintiff was injured in an inter-
section accident and claimed that the intersection constituted 
a dangerous condition within the contemplation of section 835 
of the Government Code. The court pointed out that al-
though the plaintiff made out a case under section 835, section 
830.6 provided for plan and design immunity to the county 
in this case. Justice Peters dissented on the same basis as 
he did in the Cabell case. 
The Supreme Court, in Pfeifer v. County of San Joaquin,S 
considered section 830 (a) of the Government Code, which 
defines a "dangerous condition." Under the facts, the court 
found that the plaintiff did not prove that the condition of 
the crosswalk markings created an unreasonable risk of injury 
to the pUblic. Because of this finding, it was unnecessary for 
the Court to consider the plan and design immunity of section 
830.6, urged by the county as a defense. 
6. See Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 8. 67 Ca1.2d 201, 60 Cal. Rptr. 493, 
167 N.E.2d 63 (1960). 430 P.2d 51 (1967). 
7. 67 Ca1.2d 187, 60 Cal. Rptr. 485, 
430 P.2d 43 (1967). 
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